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Exercise of Force by the Japanese
Self-Defense Forcet
Donald deKieffer *
I. Introduction
Recent events in the Middle East have focused attention on the
willingness and ability of various countries to enforce the United Na-
tions embargo of Iraq.l Japan has been the subject of frequent criti-
t The Journal would like to thank Mr. Yasushi Yoshimoto, Teaching Assistant in
Japanese, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for his translation assistance.
* Partner, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Washington, D.C. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the indispensable assistance of Mr. Takashi Shimokado of Yanagida &
Nomura, Tokyo, Japan.
Security Council Resolution 665 of August 25, 1990, reads:
The Security Council:
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990)
and demanding their full and immediate implementation;
Having decided to impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations;
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which im-
perils the existence of a member state and to restore the legitimate authority,
and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which
requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions;
Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait and determined to prevent further such losses;
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660
(1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and in particular at the con-
duct of the government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil;
1. Calls upon those member states co-operating with the government of
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the
authority of the security council to halt all inward and outward maritime
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid
down in resolution 661 (1990);
2. Invites member states accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to
ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maxi-
mum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph
one above;
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such assist-
ance as may be required by the states referred to in paragraph one of this
resolution;
4. Further requests the states concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pur-
suit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mecha-
nisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the
secretary-general to submit reports to the security council and its committee
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cism for not bearing its share of the load for the multinational
forces.2 Although most legal commentators and the popular press
are generally aware that the Japanese Constitution significantly limits
Japan's ability to provide military support, the specific provisions of
the Japanese Constitution forbidding the use of force are less well
understood. This Article considers two questions relevant to Japa-
nese constitutional limitations on the exercise of military power:
1. If Japanese ships are attacked or threatened by another
country's armed forces in the open sea far from the territory of Ja-
pan, can the Japanese government constitutionally send the Self-De-
fense Force (hereinafter "SDF") 3 to protect the Japanese ships?
2. Assuming that the proximity of U.S. and Japanese forces is
sufficiently close to secure the open sea in question, if U.S. ships are
attacked or threatened by another country's armed forces in the
open sea far from Japan, can the Japanese government constitution-
ally send the SDF to protect the U.S. ships?
The purpose of this Article is to examine the fundamental Japa-
nese constitutional limitations on the existence of the SDF and the
exercise of force in the open sea. With regard to the first question,
this Article will discuss: (1) the constitutionality of the SDF, (2)
targets which the SDF may defend from attack by another country's
armed forces, (3) geographic limitations on the exercise of force by
the SDF, and (4) conditions under which force may be exercised by
established under resolution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the
implementation of this resolution;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
S.C. Res. 665, reprinted in The Times (London), Aug. 27, 1990, at 2, col. 5.
2 Critics of the Japanese role include: Sen. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) ("So far, Japan
has done little [in the Gulf] to uphold its interest, and even that has been done quite
grudgingly."), U.S. Critics Not Satisfied Wlith Japan's $4 Billion Gulf Contribution, Washington
Post, Oct. 6, 1990, at A24, cols. 1, 2; the late Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.) ("[T]heJapanese
need to formulate a clear idea of what their responsibility to the rest of the Free World
is."), id.; and Rep. Byron Dorgan (R-N.D.) ("Even though [Japan] imports 70 percent of its
oil from vulnerable sources in the Middle East-and almost twice as much as the United
States-Japan is not willing to contribute a commensurate share to the cost of the opera-
tion."), 136 CONG. REC. E 2860 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1990). Compare, however, the views of
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger:
It is indeed true thatJapan can afford to do more to share the responsibilities
for the vitally necessary actions in the Gulf. But it is also true that Japan is
now spending more on its own defense, and that this enables the U.S. to use
more of its own forces to help block Saddam Hussein's aggression. Japan
could, and should, increase its capability to carry out its self-imposed mission
of defending its sea lanes as far out as 1,000 nautical miles and air lanes 200
nautical miles.
Weinberger, Japan s Role in the Gulf Crisis, FORBES, Oct. 29, 1990, at 60.
" The strength of the SDF is estimated as follows:
Armed Forces Personnel 247,000
Battle Tanks 1,200
Submarines 15
Major Warships 63
Combat Aircraft 362
Boston Globe, Feb. 20, 1990, at 6, cols. 1, 2.
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the SDF. With regard to the second question, this Article will discuss
whether, assuming the right of individual self-defense is constitu-
tional, the Constitution nevertheless forbids the use of the SDF in
the context of collective self-defense.
II. Does the Constitution Permit the Right of Individual Self-
Defense?
A. Constitutionality of the SDF
There have been bitter arguments in Japan on the constitution-
ality of the SDF. To understand why the Japanese people, including
the government, are so sensitive to the exercise of force by the SDF,
it is important to understand the constitutional arguments and the
inconsistent judicial decisions regarding the existence of the SDF.
Pacifism is one of the foundations of the Japanese Constitution.
Article 9 prohibits the nation from making war, using force, or main-
taining armed forces. 4 Indeed, until the end of the 1940s, the Japa-
nese government interpreted the Constitution as banning a war even
in self-defense, and prohibited the nation from maintaining any
armed forces. 5 The birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949
and the outbreak of war between North and South Korea in 1950
forced the Japanese government to change its view and establish the
SDF in 1954.6 Since then the government has taken the view that
Article 9 neither prohibits war for self-defense nor prevents the na-
tion from maintaining the minimum armed strength 7 necessary for
self-defense.8 Whether the existence of the SDF is constitutional has
not been considered by the Supreme Court of Japan, although the
court has held that the Constitution does not deny the right of self-
defense. 9
4 Article 9 of the Constitution provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
KEMP6 (Constitution) art. 9 (Japan). For the English text of the Constitution ofJapan, see
2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 415 (rev. 4th ed. 1985).
5 Yamauchi, Nihon koku kempi to jieiken kannen (The Japanese Constitution and the
Idea of the Right of Self-Defense), 47 HORITSU JIHO (No. 12) 88, 115 (1975).
;Id.
7 The government avoids using the term "force" because the second paragraph of
Article 9 prohibits "forces." The government, however, interprets "forces" in the second
paragraph as the forces which exceed the level of minimum necessity for self-defense. JA-
PAN TIMES, LTD., DEFENSE OF JAPAN 74-75 (1988). Under this interpretation, there is no
difference between "minimum armed strength necessary for self-defense" and "minimum
forces necessary for self-defense."
8 See KEMPO 9 JO: IMA FUTATABI HEIWA 0 KANGAERU TOKI (Article 9 of the Constitu-
tion: It's Time to Think About Peace Again) 76-80 (Yuhikaku ed. 1983) [hereinafter
KEMP6 9 jo].
9 Japan v. Sakata, Judgment of Dec. 16, 1959, Saik6sai (Supreme Court), 13 Keishfi
19911
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The argument opposing the constitutionality of the SDF is pre-
mised upon the view that the first paragraph of Article 9, without
reservation, prohibits all wars and the threat or use of force, even for
self-defense.' 0 This view points out that with the principle of paci-
fism declared in the preamble, the Constitution makes no provision
for the organization of armed forces. Furthermore, the first para-
graph of Article 9 prohibits "war as means of settling international
disputes," which is necessarily difficult to distinguish from other
war. "1
A similar view suggests that, although the first paragraph may
not prohibit war or the use or threat of force for the purpose of self-
defense, such war or use or threat of force is renounced by the Con-
stitution because the second paragraph of Article 9 prohibits the na-
tion from maintaining armed forces and renounces the right of
belligerency.' 2 One district court adopted this view and concluded
that the SDF was unconstitutional on the ground that the SDF had
sufficient weapons and personnel to be a "force."' 3
On the other hand, proponents of the view that Japan may main-
tain sufficient forces for self-defense sees the first paragraph of Arti-
cle 9 as not prohibiting wars for self-defense, and the second
paragraph as not prohibiting the nation from maintaining forces nec-
essary for self-defense.' 4 This view interprets Article 9 as follows:
In the interpretation of the Japanese original text of the first
paragraph of Article 9, it is natural to read the phrase "as means of
settling international disputes" as related both to "war as a sover-
eign right of the nation" and "the threat or use of force." In accord-
ance with a widely accepted interpretation of public international
law and other countries' constitutions, "as means of settling interna-
tional disputes" means actions for the purpose of invading another
country. Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 9 prohibits
the nation from maintaining forces "in order to accomplish the aim
of the preceding paragraph." The "aim 'of the preceding para-
3225. In this case, the constitutionality of the U.S. forces in Japan under the Security
Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was argued. The court decided that the first paragraph
of Article 9 did not deny Japan's right of self-defense and that the forces prohibited by the
second paragraph of Article 9 did not include forces of a foreign country. Id.
10 KIyOMIYA, KEMP6 I (Constitution I) (Horitsugaku zenshu (Collected Jurispru-
dence), no. 3) 112 (3d ed. 1979);Japan v. Sakata,Judgment of Mar. 30, 1959, Tokyo Dist.
Ct., 1 Kakeishfi 776.
1 KIYOMIYA, supra note 10, at 112.
12 1. SATO, NIHON KOKU KEMP6 GAISETSU (Survey of Japanese Constitution) 72-73
(1978); 1 HOGAKU KYOKAI, CHUKAI NIHON KOKU KEMPO (Commentary on Japanese Consti-
tution) 117-22 (1950).
13 Ito v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Judgment of Sept. 7, 1973, Sapporo
Dist. Ct., 712 HANJI 24, 89, rev d, Judgment of Aug. 5, 1976, Sapporo High Ct., 27 Gy6shfi
1175.
14 Another view which permits the government to maintain forces for self-defense
states that Article 9 is merely a political manifestation which has no judicial enforceability.
Takayanagi, Heiwa, 9jo, sai-gunbi (Peace, Article 9, and Rearmament), 25JuRIsuTo (Jurist)
2, 5 (1953).
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graph" shall be interpreted as the aim of prohibiting wars and threat
or use of force for the purpose of invading another country. The
second paragraph prohibits the nation from maintaining forces only
for the purpose of invading another country.
15
One district court adopted this interpretation, and stated that
Article 9 did not prohibit wars for self-defense, but declined to de-
cide whether the SDF was constitutional because the issue was highly
political. 16
Proponents of this view also cite the second paragraph of the
preamble of the Constitution which states that "we have determined
to preserve our security and existence" and that "all people of the
world have the right to live in peace." 17 Proponents argue that to
guarantee such a right for the people, the Constitution allows the
nation to exercise the right of self-defense against aggressors. 18
If accepted, this view does not inevitably lead to the conclusion
that the current SDF is constitutional; whether the current SDF is
within the extent of the forces necessary for self-defense remains to
be determined.1 9 Some scholars state that the extent of the forces
necessary for self-defense should be determined by the people them-
selves. 20 The Ishizuka v. Fujioka21 decision was based on this view.
In Ito v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,22 the high court reversed
the district court's conclusion that the SDF was unconstitutional,
stating that the question of whether the SDF violated Article 9 of the
Constitution was a highly political issue which should be resolved
initially by the Diet and the Cabinet and ultimately by the people.23
With respect to the interpretation of Article 9, it seems clear that
the Constitution does not prohibit Japan from maintaining forces
necessary for self-defense. The nation may, therefore, maintain
forces necessary to exercise the right of individual self-defense be-
cause the Constitution does not deny this right. The problem is to
determine the extent of what is "necessary" to exercise the right of
self-defense. It is reasonable to view the Constitution as restricting
the range of "necessity" because the Constitution explicitly provides
for pacifism based upon great regret that the nation had previously
15 S. SASAKI, KAITEI NIHON KOKU KEMPO RON (Revised Arguments on Japanese Consti-
tution) 231-34 (1954).
16 Ishizuka v. Fujioka, Judgment of Feb. 17, 1977, Mito Dist. Ct., 842 HANJI 22, 65.
17 A. PEASLEE, supra note 4, at 414.
18 0. NISHI, KUNI NO BOEI TO HO (National Defense and Law) 35 (1975). Professor
Nishi also states that the enactment process of Article 9 supports the proposition that
Article 9 does not prohibit wars for self-defense and maintaining forces for self-defense.
Nishi, The Enactment Process of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN 71, 121 (1987).
19 0. NISHI, KUNI NO BOEI TO HO, supra note 18, at 40.
20 Id.
21 Judgment of Feb. 17, 1977, Mito Dist. Ct., 842 HANJI 22.
22 Judgment of Aug. 5, 1976, Sapporo High Ct., 27 Gy6sh6 1175, rev'g Judgment of
Sept. 7, 1973, Sapporo Dist. Ct., 712 HANJi 24.
23 Id. at 1231.
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abused the right of self-defense. In terms of this view, the govern-
ment's standard of "minimum necessity" for self-defense is reason-
able as a general standard. Whether the current SDF is within
minimum necessity, however, cannot be stated with certainty without
more study on the status of the current SDF. The discussion below
will assume that the current SDF is permitted under the
Constitution.
B. Targets Which the SDF May Defend from Attack by Another
Country's Armed Forces
The Japanese government has taken the position that, under the
Constitution, the SDF can exercise force only in the face of an immi-
nent and unjust invasion of Japan proper. 24 According to the gov-
ernment's interpretation of Article 76(1) of the Self-Defense Force
Law, 25 the subjects of an armed attack from the outside shall be lim-
ited to the territory of Japan and to nearby Japanese ships and air-
craft.26 This interpretation is based upon the assumption that an
attack on ships or aircraft near the territory is deemed to be an attack
on the territory itself. As a matter of the interpretation of the Con-
stitution, an attack against ships or aircraft which are in the open sea,
whether they are near or far from the territory, may justify Japan's
exercise of the right of self-defense if such an attack of ships or air-
craft threatens the existence of Japan.
With respect to what target must be attacked to justify the exer-
cise of a nation's right of self-defense, there are several interpreta-
tions of public international law. One view insists that targets of
attack must be in the "nation's general benefit" to be within the pro-
tection of public international law.2 7 These targets include its peo-
ple and property in foreign countries and the rights of commerce,
aviation, fishing, and development in the open sea. Another, more
restrictive, view holds that targets of attack must be in the "nation's
fundamental benefit" to be within the sphere of self-defense allowed
by public international law. Under this view, self-defense is limited
to the protection of the nation's territorial integrity and political
independence.2 8
24 0. NISHI, KUNI NO BOM TO HO, supra note 18, at 224.
25 Article 76(1) of the Self-Defense Force Law provides:
The Prime Minister may order the SDF to move in the case of an occur-
rence of an armed attack from the outside when he or she decides that it is
necessary for the defense of Japan.
Jieitai ho (Self-Defense Force Law), art. 76(l), Law No. 165 of 1954.
26 O. NISHI, KUNI NO BOEI TO HO, supra note 18, at 224.
27 Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM.J. INT'L
L. 544, 548 (1971); Franck, JIho Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM.J. INT'L L. 809, 828-29 (1970).
28 Franck, supra note 27, at 819. Cf. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-95
(1958) (International law does not necessarily require an armed attack as a precondition
for the use of force; otherwise grave wrongs could be committed without vindication. Fur-
thermore, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the goals of establishing condi-
[VOL. 16
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The position of the Japanese government is in accordance with
this latter view of public international law, which is understandable
given the limitations of the Japanese Constitution. The principle of
pacifism under the Constitution also requires this more restrictive
interpretation.
An attack on ships or aircraft far from Japanese territory, how-
ever, could in fact threaten the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of Japan, especially considering that maritime transport is
vital to Japan's existence. The idea that an attack on ships or aircraft
could threaten the existence of a nation which depends upon mari-
time transport was accepted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1974.29 In the Definition of Aggression Resolution; "ag-
gression" was defined to include "the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political indepen-
dence of another State,"3 0 and "[a]n attack by the armed forces of a
State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of an-
other State." 3 1
During the drafting procedure, a Japanese delegate pointed out
that the provisions of the Definition of Aggression Resolution con-
cerning an attack on marine and air fleets are important because
such an attack on his country's fleets would be equivalent to a block-
ade of Japan's coast.3 2 An analyst of the Draft Declaration stated
that, taking into consideration that marine transport is vital to Ja-
pan's existence, there could be a case where an attack against Japa-
nese ships would be just as devastating and therefore just as much an
act of aggression as an invasion or blockade.
33
Therefore, in the event that Japanese ships in the open sea far
from the territory of Japan are attacked by another country's armed
forces, it seems reasonable that Japan may send the SDF to protect
them if such an attack threatens the existence of Japan.
C. Geographical Limitations on the Exercise of Force by the SDF
With respect to the issue of the exercise of force in the open
sea,3 4 the Japanese government has taken the view that the SDF may
tions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising under international law
can be maintained).
29: Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
30 Id. art. 1.
31 Id. art. 3(d).
32 Report of Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 19) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974), reprinted in 2 B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNA-
TIONAL AGGRESSION, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 571 (1975).
33 B. FERENCZ, supra note 32, at 36.
34 Another issue is whether the government may send the SDF to the territory of
another country. The Japanese government has emphasized that the Constitution prohib-
its the government from sending the SDF to the territory of another country because do-
ing so goes beyond the limitation of the minimum extent necessary. JAPAN TIMES, LTD.,
1991]
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exercise force only in the open sea near Japanese territory.3 5 Like
the issue of "targets of attack," there could be a situation in which an
attack in the open sea far from Japan would threaten the existence of
Japan. It may be constitutional to send the SDF to protect ships in
the open sea, wherever located, if the attack on such ships threatens
the existence of Japan.
D. Conditions Under Which Force May Be Exercised by the SDF
The principle of pacifism under the Constitution requires the
restrictive exercise of the right of self-defense. The Japanese gov-
ernment has taken the position that there are three conditions for
the exercise of force by the SDF under the right of self-defense: (1)
there must be an imminent and unjust invasion against Japan; (2)
there must be no other proper means of defense; and (3) force must
be exercised to the minimum extent necessary.3 6 These conditions
are reasonable under the principle of pacifism of the Constitution.
III. Does the Constitution Permit Not Only a Right of Individual
Self-Defense but Also a Right of Collective Self-Defense?
A right of collective self-defense is defined as a right of one
country to use its own armed forces in the defense of a second coun-
try from attack by a third country.3 7 The United Nations Charter
recognizes the right of collective self-defense,3 8 which was adopted
to make the United Nations collective security system effective where
a standing member of the Security Council exercises its veto.
Although Japan has a right of collective self-defense as a mem-
ber of the United Nations, 3 9 the Japanese government has taken the
view that the Constitution does not recognize the right of collective
self-defense. The government stated:
Under the Constitution's principle of pacifism, Article 9 allows
the nation to exercise forces only to the minimum extent necessary
to defend Japan itself. Exercising the right of collective self-defense
under which a nation may exercise forces to defend another country
from another country's armed attack is beyond the extent of the ex-
supra note 7, at 75. See also KoGo BOEIHO (Defense Law in Spoken Language) 340 (Utsu-
nomiya ed. 1976).
35 Koco BOEIHO, supra note 34, at 341.
36 JAPAN TIMES, LTD., supra note 7, at 75; KEMP6 9 jo, supra note 8, at 84-85.
37 1 S. TABATA, KOKUSAI HO (Public International Law) (Horitsugaku zenshu (Col-
lected Jurisprudence), no. 55) 359 (1979). There is disagreement on the definition of the
right of collective self-defense.
38 Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
39 Article 5(c) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provided that the Allied Powers rec-
ognize thatJapan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Treaty of Peace with Japan,
Sept. 8, 1951, art. 5(c), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3174, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 52.
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ercise of force which the Constitution allows.40
Considering that the adoption of pacifism was based on the
great regret that Japan had previously abused the right of self-de-
fense, and may be subject to further abuse, the government's view is
reasonable.
Recently, some scholars have insisted that the Japanese Consti-
tution posits the right of collective self-defense. This view reasons
that, except for the things explicitly prohibited by Article 9, the Con-
stitution does not expressly prohibit the exercise of the right of col-
lective self-defense, or for that matter, any other actions permitted
by public international law and the U.N. Charter.4 ' This view cannot
be accepted because it fails to consider the reason why the Constitu-
tion provides for unconditional pacifism and ignores the restrictions
necessitated by the principle of pacifism.
IV. Conclusion
The restrictive interpretations of the Japanese Constitution with
respect to the exercise of force by the SDF all follow from the consti-
tutional principle of pacifism. The Constitution did not declare it as
a flowery word- pacifism was adopted based upon Japan's great re-
gret for causing World War II and involving the people of Japan and
other nations in war disaster. During the forty-five years since World
War II, Japan's position and role in international society has changed
dramatically. Today, Japan should make its best efforts to satisfy the
demands of international society to the extent permitted by its
Constitution.
40 Mizushima, Kemp5 9jo to shudan-teki jiei ken (Article 9 of the Constitution and the
Right of Collective Self-Defense), 32 HOGAKU SEMINAR (No. 5) 38, 39 (1987).
41 Kobayashi, Jieiken to jiei'oku (The Right of Self-Defense and the Self-Defense
Force), in KEMP6 NO SOTEN (Constitutional Arguments) 47, 49 (1985).
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